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Abstract 
 
The main research question of this paper is the combined estimation of the effects of 
educational systems, school composition, track level, and country of origin on the educational 
achievement of 15-year-old migrant students. We focus specifically on the effects of 
socioeconomic and ethnic background on achievement scores and the extent to which these 
effects are affected by characteristics of the school, track, or educational system in which 
these students are enrolled. In doing so, we examine the ‘sorting’ mechanisms of schools and 
tracks in highly stratified, moderately stratified, and comprehensive education systems. We 
use data from the 2006 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) wave. 
Compared with previous research in this area, the paper’s main contribution is that we 
explicitly include the tracks-within-school level as a separate unit of analyses, which leads to 
less biased results concerning the effects of educational system characteristics. 
The results highlight the importance of including factors of track level and school 
composition in the debate surrounding educational inequality of opportunity for students in 
different education contexts. The findings clearly indicate that the effects of educational 
system characteristics are flawed if the analysis only uses a country- and a student level and 
ignores the tracks-within-school level characteristics. From a policy perspective, the most 
important finding is that educational systems are neither uniformly ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, but they 
can result in different consequences for different migrant groups. Some migrant groups are 
better off in comprehensive systems, while others are better off in moderately stratified 
systems. 
 
1. Introductioni 
 
The low educational achievement level of migrant students in most Western countries 
is a growing concern for policymakers for two reasons. First, high educational achieving is a 
pre-requisite for successful integration into society and thus the best strategy to combat 
societal exclusion and discrimination of minority groups. Second, with the increasing 
globalisation of the economy, Western countries face greater competition from rapidly 
developing countries such as China and India. Increasing the stock of human capital is seen as 
the best way to secure economic growth and prosperity (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2010). 
Many studies have shown that the low educational achievement of migrant students is 
partly explained by their lower socioeconomic status. But even controlling for this aspect, 
research still points toward a wide gap between native and migrant students in educational 
achievement. What is interesting from a policy perspective is that there is a substantial 
variation among migrant students themselves. This variation is linked to individual 
characteristics such as the student’s destination language, whether the student is a first- or 
second-generation migrant, age of migration, having one or two non-native parents, and so 
forth (Chiswick & Miller, 1996; 2002). 
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This study focuses on the effects of certain education system characteristics on 
migrant students’ performance. A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2007) showed that the more differentiated a country’s educational 
system, the more native pupils outperform migrant pupils, even after taking into account 
social background characteristics. Ammermüller (2005), who used a more restricted 
measurement of differentiation (number of school types available), reached a more nuanced 
conclusion. The more different school types migrant students can choose from in secondary 
education, the better they perform on average. However, such a school system with choice 
between different school types enhances the negative effect of speaking that language at 
home. 
Although these studies examine educational system effects on migrants, this is not the 
main focus of their analysis. Moreover, they lack an adequate design to study the effects of 
migrants’ countries of origin and destination as these relate to their eventual educational 
achievement. The current paper builds on earlier work of Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp 
(2008) and Heus and Dronkers (2010a; 2010b) who have focused on the influence of both 
societal and educational system characteristics of migrants’ countries of origin and destination 
on their educational achievement. All of these studies use the cross-classified multilevel 
design first introduced by Tubergen, Maas, and Flap (2004). Instead of relying on 
observations of multiple-origin groups in a single destination or a single-origin group in 
multiple destinations, the authors proposed a combined method that allows a comparison of 
multiple origins in multiple destinations. ii Levels et al. (2008) show that the economic 
development level (gross domestic product per capita) of countries of origin negatively affects 
performance and that migrants originating from more politically stable countries perform 
better at school. Moreover, the higher educational performance of migrants’ children living in 
traditional immigration societies can be fully explained by their favourable socioeconomic 
background composition. Heus and Dronkers (2010b) found that migrant students performed 
on average better in comprehensive educational systems, but this was true only for children 
from privileged socioeconomic circumstances. They also show that migrants from countries 
with an Eastern religious affiliation perform better than migrants from Christian countries, 
while migrants from Islamic countries perform worse. 
Heus and Dronkers’ (2010b) finding that migrant students on average perform better 
in comprehensive educational systems, but that this was only the case for privileged children 
is not in line with earlier findings for natives (Breen & Jonsson, 2000; Buchmann & Hannum, 
2001; OECD, 2005). These studies show that the effect of parental background on the 
achievement of their offspring is much lower in the comprehensive systems than in the highly 
stratified ones, which is opposite of that of Heus and Dronkers (2010b). Greater agreement 
can be observed regarding the overall educational system effect: both native and migrant 
students have on average higher scores in comprehensive educational systems compared with 
equivalent students in highly stratified educational systems. This means that countries in 
which students follow the same curriculum up to age 16 show higher results on achievement 
tests than countries in which students are directed into different secondary education tracks at 
very early ages. 
 
A major problem with the above-mentioned studies (both for natives and migrants) is 
that they use a simple two-level model with a distinction between countries (origin and 
destination with societal and educational system characteristics) and students (with individual 
and family characteristics). Thus, they ignore the fact that there are more levels that affect 
student achievement. Students are nested in schools and within schools along different tracks, 
and all of these environments produce sources of variation in achievement levels. 
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Recently Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) introduced a three-level model: 
countries, schools, and students. They showed that school characteristics like socioeconomic 
composition and ethnic diversity have substantial effects on achievement levels and also 
affect the relation between parental background and achievement. Moreover, these school 
characteristics seem to mediate some of the effects of educational system characteristics 
found earlier. They show that one of the reasons the relation between parental background 
and achievement is stronger in stratified educational systems is that these systems show 
stronger effects of the particular school a student attends. 
However, these two papers still do not include the track level as a separate level in the 
analysis. This is a serious omission if we consider stratified systems. It is unlikely that the 
results of stratified systems pertain to all of the tracks that can be distinguished. In fact it 
might well be that the negative results of such systems only pertain to the lower or vocational 
tracks in these systems, while opposite results might be found for higher or more general 
tracks. In addition, they identified schools only by administrative unit and not by track level. 
This means that students in schools with different tracks are all regarded as being exposed to 
the same environment. Both omissions can produce flawed results, because track level has a 
strong effect on achievement. This might even be truer in the case of migrant students, as they 
are more heavily concentrated in the lower and vocational tracks. 
 
The contribution of the current paper is to improve the earlier work on two points: 1. 
Inclusion of track characteristics; 2. Use of ‘tracks-within-school’ level, indexed by school-
identification number, track level, and vocational orientation instead of the administrative 
school level and define school composition characteristics at this level. 
The main research question of this paper is the estimation of the effects of educational 
systems, school composition and track level on the educational achievement of 15-year-old 
migrant students. We focus specifically on the effects of socioeconomic and ethnic 
background on achievement scores and to what extent these effects are affected by 
characteristics of the school, track, or educational system in which these students are enrolled. 
In doing so, we examine the ‘sorting’ mechanisms of schools and tracks in highly stratified, 
moderately stratified, and comprehensive education systems. 
We use the 2006 data wave of the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) (OECD, 2007). We include only those countries that provide information about the 
countries of birth of students and parents, so that we can identify the countries of origin. 
Therefore, the analysis is based on 8,521 migrant students from 35 different countries of 
origin, living in 15 Western destination countries. We use a four-level multilevel analysis 
with cross-classified origin and destination levels. 
 
The results highlight the importance of including track level and school characteristics 
in the debate concerning educational inequality of opportunity for migrant students in 
different education contexts. The findings clearly indicate that the effects of educational 
system characteristics are flawed if the analysis uses only a country- and a student level and 
ignores the track-level characteristics. From a policy perspective, the most important finding 
is that educational systems are neither uniformly ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ but produce different 
consequences for different migrant groups. Some migrant groups are better off in 
comprehensive systems, while others are better off in moderately stratified systems. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present an 
overview of the literature followed by the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
operationalization of the variables. Section 4 describes the models and Section 5 the main 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Overview of the Literatureiii 
 
This paper builds on two strands of research: general research on the inequality of 
educational opportunity and specialised research that focuses on migrant student achievement. 
Previous comparative work focused on the reproduction of inequality and its relation to the 
degree of educational systems’ stratification (Treiman & Yip, 1989; Muller & Karle, 1993; 
Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Filmer & Pritchett, 1999; Shavit, Arum 
& Gamoran, 2007; Pfeffer, 2008). Such reproduction is affected not only by educational 
system characteristics, but also by school characteristics, specifically the school’s 
socioeconomic composition. However, the effect of the school’s socioeconomic composition 
and its ‘sorting’ effect may vary across countries. One reason is that countries vary in the way 
they sort students during their secondary education instruction career. In this section, we will 
first present an overview of the research on school factors and subsequently on the 
institutional aspects of educational systems. Most of this literature was originally aimed at 
explaining the inequality of educational opportunity for natives. However, most of the 
reasoning can be applied to migrant students as well. Next, we will present specific research 
aimed at explaining the low achievement of migrant students’ low achievement. It is the goal 
of this paper to analyse the effects of both socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds on migrant 
students’ achievement scores and the extent to which these effects are affected by 
characteristics of the school, track, or educational system in which these students are enrolled. 
 
2.1. School Factors 
Since the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) in the United States and the Plowden 
Report (Peaker, 1971) in the United Kingdom, there has been a debate on the relative 
importance of individual and school factors. These reports concluded that individual family 
background was more important than school factors in determining children’s educational 
achievement. Since these reports were published, much research has concentrated on 
assessing the relative importance of individual versus school effects. 
Borrowing from both the economic and organisational definitions of school 
effectiveness (Scheerens & Bosker, 1997), we define schools as organisations that have 
particular processes in place to turn inputs into output. Inputs to a school include the students’ 
prior characteristics, whereas outputs include student achievement. This transformative 
process that occurs within a school is composed of many factors that include teaching and 
learning methods, track choices, and organisational conditions that enable student learning. 
Earlier research revealed the importance of parental socioeconomic status on educational 
achievement (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Jencks, 1972, Jencks et al., 1979, Hauser & Sewell, 
1986). This is true for migrant students as well (see Heus & Dronkers, 2010b). Later research 
also identified a link between differences in achievement scores and differences in the student 
body composition within the schools. They show that the school’s mean socioeconomic 
background has an impact on student achievement over and above the effect of a student’s 
individual socioeconomic background (Gamoran, 1992; Willms, 1986, 1992). 
OECD (2005) used the PISA 2000 data and applied a comparative perspective to 
examine the ways schools’ socioeconomic composition affects achievement. In line with the 
research mentioned above, the report concluded that a school’s average socioeconomic status 
had a statistically significant impact on student performance in reading literacy in all but four 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Korea). Furthermore, school composition effects 
far outweighed the impact of other policy-amenable characteristics. Together with individual 
characteristics, a school’s socioeconomic composition explained on average 69 percent of the 
school effects, compared with only 6 percent explained by policy-amenable school 
characteristics. 
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Thus, results from these studies show the strong link between a school’s 
socioeconomic composition and student performance and achievement. However, studies 
have not shown whether this strong relationship between school composition and student 
achievement varies systematically across educational systems. Nevertheless, this concept 
seems plausible: Because countries vary in the way they sort their students for instruction, it 
follows that composition effects would vary across countries. 
One important sorting mechanism is ability grouping or tracking. Many studies have 
found evidence that early division of students into ability groups or tracks increases inequality 
(Kerckhoff, 1986; Oakes, Gamoran, & Page, 1992; Gamoran, 2004). Research has explored 
achievement and inequality (Hargreaves, 1967; Dustmann, 2004; Ammermüller, 2005), in 
distinct tracks (Rosenbaum, 1976; Metz, 1978; Oakes, 1985; Gamoran, 1992; Gamoran et al., 
1995), and placement into sets (or curricular differentiation; Lucas, 1999). Although these all 
represent different ways to differentiate students into ability groupings, all types of ability 
grouping result in an further enlargement of unequal educational opportunities. It is plausible 
that this applies even more strongly to migrants’ children. Migrants’ strategic knowledge 
concerning the educational system and how their offspring’s educational choices will affect 
future educational careers is probably even less developed than that of native parents from 
low socioeconomic status. 
Ability grouping is not just a school characteristic but most often a characteristic that 
directly results from the institutional design of the educational system. We will explore this in 
more detail in the section below. 
 
2.2. Stratification in Educational Systems 
Spring (1976) has referred to educational institutions as society’s ‘sorting machine’. 
Organisational characteristics of schools and education systems effectively channel students 
into different educational paths and eventual life opportunities. All industrialised countries 
use organisational mechanisms to sort students into hierarchically arranged tracks, but these 
mechanisms vary in both their nature and also in their timing. Hopper (1968:30) argued that 
‘the structure of educational systems, especially those within industrial society, can be 
understood primarily in terms of the structure of their selection processes’. Systems can be 
identified as those that use separate school types to stratify students, those that have a high 
level of within-school/internal stratification without distinct school types, and systems that are 
comprehensive with low levels of within-school differentiation. 
Early in the debate on the impact of how countries sort their students for instruction, 
Turner (1960) contributed to the discussion by characterising educational systems as being 
either ‘contest mobility’ or ‘sponsored mobility’ systems. He characterised comprehensive 
education systems as ‘contest mobility’, with the objective being to ‘train as many as possible 
in the skills necessary for elite status so as to give everyone a chance to maintain competition 
at the highest pitch’; and highly selective systems as ‘sponsored mobility’ with the objective 
being to ‘indoctrinate elite culture in only those presumably who will enter the elite, lest there 
grow a dangerous number of “angry young men” who have elite skills without elite station’ 
(Turner, 1960:863). 
Following this argument, many studies have investigated the degree of educational 
system stratification and its impact on the inequality of educational opportunity. Studies have 
revealed the variability across countries in the magnitude of family background effects on 
student outcomes (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001) and how this is partly explained by the way 
in which a country sorts students to receive instruction (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2006). 
Findings from Breen and Jonsson (2000), Mare (1993), and Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) 
suggest that comprehensive school reform in countries with previously highly stratified 
education systems reduced educational opportunity inequality. However, Breen and Jonsson 
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(2005), in their review of inequality of opportunity in a comparative perspective, suggest the 
need to ‘draw on evidence from more countries’. 
The OECD (2005) report School Factors Related to Quality and Equity, Results from 
PISA 2000, which utilised data from PISA 2000, is one example from which evidence was 
drawn from a wide range of countries. The results indicate secondary education’s structural 
relevance within each participating country. The report used age of selection as an indicator 
of institutional differentiation and considered its effect on student achievement. The results 
indicate that education systems with the lowest degree of differentiation achieved ‘the highest 
mean student performance in reading literacy’ (OECD, 2005:62). Using the PISA 2000 data, 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) also found evidence that early tracking reduced mean 
performance. Heus and Dronkers (2010b) report similar findings for migrant students. 
Migrants in a comprehensive educational system have on average a higher performance level 
than migrants in a highly stratified system. 
The OECD report also indicated that in countries with early selection, the correlation 
between students’ socioeconomic background and students’ performance was stronger. These 
findings supported Kerckhoff’s (1995) argument that the effects of family socioeconomic 
status on educational outcomes were stronger in highly stratified systems of education. Later 
analysis of PISA data by Marks, Cresswell, and Ainley (2006) confirmed this finding that 
countries with highly tracked systems tended to show stronger relationships between 
socioeconomic background and achievement. Horn (2009) also concluded that the early age 
of selection in some countries is closely linked with high inequality of opportunity. Pfeffer 
(2008:556) looked at which nations were most successful in reducing the influence of family 
background on educational attainment by using the International Adult Literacy Survey and 
found that ‘rigid education systems with dead-end educational pathways appear to be a 
hindrance to the equalisation of educational opportunities’. In such a system, parental 
strategic knowledge is crucial to help children make optimal choices. Migrants obviously lack 
much of this strategic knowledge. This presents no problem as long as no choices must be 
made, as is the case in a comprehensive system. It might not even be such a problem if the 
choices that must be made are clear-cut. Highly stratified systems with clear institutional 
borders between hierarchically ranked tracks probably present less of a problem for migrants 
than moderately stratified systems that have fuzzier borders. Many migrants feel a strong 
desire for upward mobility and given the choice will probably aim for the most prestigious 
tracks. In moderately stratified systems with forms of internal ability grouping, migrant 
parents might have more difficulty deciding which choice is optimal for their children. 
 
2.3. Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) Results 
A major drawback of many of the previously mentioned studies is that they fail to 
combine the two lines of research: the effects of 1) school factors and 2) educational system 
characteristics. They concentrate on either the effects of schools or the effects of educational 
systems. Both may produce flawed results, as the effects of schools may differ across 
different educational systems and schools in fact produce part of the effects of educational 
systems. Recently Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) made a major improvement to the 
methodology by introducing a three-level model in the analysis: countries, schools, and 
students. 
Using PISA 2006 data, Dunne selected 23 countries that represent a wide range of 
comparable societies. The countries selected are Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.iv She applied the three-level model 
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(students, school, and countries) and distinguished between native and migrant students, with 
only two dummies to control for first and second generations. 
She found that students in comprehensive schooling systems have higher overall 
average achievement, which appears to reflect the fact that students in low socioeconomic 
composition schools in comprehensive systems do not lose as much as do those in low 
socioeconomic composition schools in highly stratified systems. Also, she found very little 
difference in the average achievement of students in highly stratified education systems and 
moderately stratified education systems. 
Inequality of opportunity at the individual level did not appear to be as Dunne 
expected from the evidence in previous research. Students from a higher socioeconomic 
background actually achieve less in highly stratified education systems than their counterparts 
in comprehensive systems, unless they are in high socioeconomic composition schools. 
Therefore, although inequality in educational opportunity is greater in highly stratified 
systems, it is mediated through school-composition effects. Still, there is a small individual 
social background effect within schools in highly stratified educational systems. 
The degree of stratification of the educational system determines the extent to which 
the school’s socioeconomic composition becomes a crucial element in student achievement. 
Placement into a higher socioeconomic school is a more significant condition for achievement 
in highly stratified systems. In comprehensive systems, achievement is very similar across 
schools with different socioeconomic compositions; therefore, there is an advantage for those 
in low socioeconomic composition schools in this comprehensive system compared with 
those in low socioeconomic schools in highly stratified education systems. On the other hand, 
individual socioeconomic background has a stronger effect on achievement within schools in 
comprehensive education systems. 
Interestingly, although average student achievement varied greatly depending on the 
school’s socioeconomic composition in highly stratified education systems, within schools the 
gap in achievement between students from the top and the bottom socioeconomic 
backgrounds was relatively narrow in comparison with students in comprehensive systems 
and moderately stratified systems. It appears that there is greater between-school equity 
within comprehensive education systems, but within-school equity is higher in highly 
stratified systems. Accordingly, it may be more difficult for students from a lower 
socioeconomic status to enter higher socioeconomic composition schools in highly stratified 
education systems, but once these students have entered such schools, the effect of their 
individual background does not hinder them unduly in their quest to achieve high scores. 
 
Dronkers (2010a) also used the 2006 PISA data, based on a slightly different selection 
of countries than Dunne. He included only those countries that provide information 
concerning the countries in which students and their parents were born, in order to properly 
identify the countries of origin. He showed that the socioeconomic composition of a school is 
of great importance. He found relatively few differences in the effect of the average parental 
educational level of students at school in the different education systems. In addition, he 
observed that students from non-Islamic Asia have an advantage when it comes to educational 
performance, compared with migrants from other origin countries. Conversely, students from 
Islamic countries have a substantial disadvantage in educational performance compared with 
other migrants. Finally, he found that education systems do not always confer the same type 
of positive or negative effects on the achievement of native students and students with an 
migrant background. 
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2.4. Hypotheses 
As indicated above, the studies by Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) distinguish 
three levels in the analyses: countries, schools, and students. Although this is an improvement 
compared with the previous two-level studies, these studies are still biased, as they ignore one 
of the key levels, the level of track. Track placement is one of the major characteristics 
affecting educational opportunity inequality, serving as the ‘sorting’ mechanism of 
educational systems. It is therefore strange that this level has never been separately identified 
in previous analyses. Ignoring this level assumes that having a strongly stratified system will 
have the same effect for the students in the higher as well as the lower tracks. Similarly, 
ignoring this level assumes that school factors have the same effect for students of all the 
tracks within that school. Both assumptions are very unlikely. Our first three hypotheses can 
be seen as improving the hypotheses of Dunne (2010) by explicitly including the track level 
as an additional explanatory level. Unlike the analysis by Dunne (2010), these hypotheses are 
tested exclusively for the migrant students.v We have added two additional hypotheses, one 
concerning the possible different effect of educational systems for migrants and natives 
(based on the analysis of Heus & Dronkers, 2010b) and a second one about reproduction by 
the combination of individual parental class and school-composition (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1977). 
 
Educational systems; school composition; track; and parental economic, social, and cultural 
status (ESCS) 
1. Track placement explains a substantial part of ESCS school composition effects on 
achievement but mostly in highly stratified educational systems, due to the institutionalised 
borders in these systems. 
2. The positive effect of ESCS school composition on achievement is strongest in highly and 
moderately stratified systems, because ESCS school composition indicates both the level of 
the track and ESCS neighbourhood composition, while ESCS school composition in 
comprehensive educational systems indicates only differentiation in ESCS neighbourhood 
composition. But if one controls for track level, this stronger effect of ESCS school 
composition in highly and moderately stratified systems should disappear. 
3. If one controls for track placement, the effect of individual ESCS on achievement is 
stronger in comprehensive systems: the lack of selection into hierarchical track-levels forces 
parents of a higher socioeconomic status to use their cultural and social capital more to ensure 
sufficient school performance at age 15. 
 
Migrant students and educational systems 
4. Students with an migrant background experience the highest achievement in strongly 
stratified systems, because these provide them with clear information about their scholastic 
requirements, or in comprehensive educational systems, because these do not have 
institutionalised borders, which might preclude higher educational performance. 
 
Reproduction 
5. The interactive effect of individual ESCS and ESCS school composition on achievement is 
positive and equal in all educational systems, because this combination of individual and 
school-composition ESCS indicates a higher level of unmeasured cultural and financial 
capital of both parents and school. 
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3. Data and Operationalisation 
 
3.1. PISA 2006 
Since 2000, the OECD has tri-annually conducted large-scale tests among 15-year-
olds living in its member states and partner states in order to assess students’ mathematical, 
reading, and scientific literacy. The purpose of this test is to map the competences in the fields 
of mathematics, physics, and reading at the end of the period of compulsory education (at the 
age of 15 or 16 in most Western countries). We use of the 2006 wave. The PISA data for each 
participating country constitute a representative sample of the schools that teach 15-year-old 
students. Each school that has been selected tests a sample of all 15-year-olds, irrespective of 
their track or grade. In addition to educational performance, PISA also supplies information 
on a large number of individual background characteristics and school characteristics. The 
school principals provide details on a variety of school characteristics, such as student-teacher 
ratio, teacher shortages, and the location of the school. In the student questionnaires, students 
are asked for information on such elements as parents’ educational level, the availability of 
resources at home, the language spoken at home, and the birth country of their parents. 
Considering that the information on the country of origin of both parents is crucial for our 
research question, we can only include countries that have actually provided information on 
these countries of origin. Although no fewer than 57 countries took part in PISA 2006, only 
the following 15 Western countries had this information available: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, and Switzerland.vi The selection leaves us with 8,581 
migrant students from 35 different countries of origin, living in 15 Western destination 
countries.vii Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A. For a detailed description of 
the data and performance scores of the students from the different countries of origin, we refer 
to previous publications (Dronkers, 2010a; Heus & Dronkers, 2010b). 
 
3.2. Schools and Tracks-within-schools as Separate Units of Analysis 
The PISA data contain two cross-national indicators of the track the students are 
attending. The student was asked whether he or she is currently enrolled in a certain track at a 
certain level. This response was later recoded in the international format distinguishing 
between general and vocational tracks on the one hand and between lower and higher tracks 
on the other hand. This recoding by the national PISA data managers probably reflects the 
official national policy regarding the placement of different tracks into the international 
classification. For instance, we can see this clearly by comparing Finland and Scotland in 
Appendix B: all 15-year-old students in Finland attend lower general education, while all their 
counterparts in Scotland attend higher general education. The PISA data offer no other 
information to differentiate this coding any further to make it more comparable. The same 
held for Germany where all students with a general track were coded at the lower level. 
However, the national specific program code in the PISA data for Germany allowed us to 
distinguish between those students of general lower education with and without access to 
higher secondary education and between lower and higher vocational education (see 
Appendix B). For the other countries, this was not possible. As a general result, the level of 
‘noise’ in the measurement of the real track level will increase and therefore underestimate 
the ‘real’ track-level effect. This should be kept in mind when looking at the results of track-
level effects.viii 
Schools are the sampling unit in the PISA survey, but they often contain both general 
and vocational education and both levels within secondary education. The school level 
therefore reflects more the educational institution’s administrative unit, while the combined 
two-track characteristics reflect more the daily reality of the teaching and learning 
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environment, and also of the social intercourse between students and teachers. This daily life 
unit is a better indicator of the actual school environment of teaching and learning than the 
administrative unit. We call this the tracks within-school level. We compute this level per 
country for each student by combining his or her school-identification number, the kind of 
track he or she is following (vocational or general), and the track level (lower or higher). The 
result of this redefinition of school environment from an administrative unit into the daily life 
unit of teaching and learning is visible in Appendix B. For example, in Australia, 345 schools 
offered lower general education, 133 schools higher general education, and 10 schools higher 
vocational education for more than 5 students per school. In order to avoid extreme results for 
combinations with few cases, we deleted all combinations of school-identification number, 
vocational or general education, and the track level, which had less than 6 students (natives 
and migrants) per school. This means that the analysis will be based on 8,521 migrant 
students from 35 different countries of origin, living in 15 Western destination countries. 
 
3.3. Dependent Variable: Linguistic Performance 
The dependent variable in this study is linguistic performance. To measure linguistic 
skills accurately would make the test too long to be feasible. Hence, a large number of very 
similar, but shorter tests were created. As such different tests can never have exactly the same 
degree of difficulty, item response modelling (IRM) was used to achieve comparable results 
between students who answered different variants of the same test. In this analysis, we 
averaged the five plausible values that were obtained from the IRM. The linguistic skills 
scores were standardised for the OECD countries using an average of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100. Appendix C shows the average literacy scores for migrant students for the 
origin and destination countries. Appendix E shows the outcomes if the dependent variable 
were mathematical literacy or science literacy. The results indicate that the conclusions do not 
change much if we were to take another dependent variable. 
 
3.4. Individual-level Variables 
 Parental ESCS. The ESCS index of the parents is a composite index created within the 
PISA dataset of the parents’ occupational status measured with the Index of economic, social 
and cultural status ISEI scale (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman, & De Leeuw, 1992), the 
educational level of the parents measured with the ISCED classification (UNESCO, 2006), 
and the presence of any material or cultural resources at the students’ homes.ix This 
combination of the parents’ occupational status and educational level, together with the 
resources at home, produces the strongest indicator of parental environment. We set the 
average of parental ESCS for each destination country to zero, to ensure that the comparisons 
for this item show the result for the average student in these countries. 
 Grade. Since not all students attend the same grade, we have included a variable to 
account for this. As a result of between-country variance in the way grades are constructed, 
we have standardised the grade around the modal grade in a country. 
 Female. We control for gender effects by using a dummy variable indicating whether a 
student is female (1) or male (0). 
 Regions of origin. Based on earlier analyses of PISA 2003 data (Levels & Dronkers, 
2008; Levels et al., 2008), we combined the countries of origin into five regions of origin in 
order to simplify the presentation of the analysis: 1. Eastern Europe (Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Rumania, Russia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine); 2. non-Islamic Asia (China, India, 
Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam); 3. Islamic countries (Albania, Bangladesh, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Turkey); 4. Western OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
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Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States); 5. Sub-Saharan Africa (Cape Verde, Congo, 
South Africa).x 
 Second-generation migrant. In line with Rumbaut (2004), we have constructed 
migrant generation variables that combine information on the birth country of both parents 
and the student. Second-generation migrant children are those students for whom at least one 
parent was born abroad, but who have been born in the current country of destination 
themselves. First-generation migrant students have been born abroad themselves as well. A 
dummy indicates whether the student is second generation (1) or not (0). 
 One parent migrant, other parent native. A dummy variable was used to identify 
students who had one migrant and one native-born parent (1); students with two non-native 
parents represent the reference group (0). 
 Home language same as in destination country. We included a dummy variable to 
differentiate migrant children who speak one of their destination country’s official languages 
at home (1) from children who speak a foreign language (0). 
 
3.5. Variables Measured at the Tracks-within-schools Level 
 Vocational. A dummy variable indicates whether a student is currently enrolled in a 
(pre-) vocational (1) or general (0) type of education (ISCED classification). 
 Higher secondary. This dummy distinguishes the current track level within secondary 
education as higher secondary (1) or lower secondary (0). 
 Ethnic diversity. Using the numbers of students from all 35 countries of origin, we 
calculated the Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity per tracks-within-school (varying between 
0 and 1).xi All of the 35 countries of origin here represented a separate ethnic group; in 
addition, so did the native students.xii The index should be interpreted as follows: The value 0 
means that there was no ethnic diversity at all in the school, because all students came from 
the same country of origin. Values that approach 1 represent a very high degree of diversity: 
the students at that track-within-school are equally recruited from all origin countries, 
including the home country. The Herfindahl index has been criticised for being ‘colour-blind’ 
(Voas, Crockett, & Olson, 2002; Stolle, Soraka, & Johnston, 2008), which means that a 
school with 20 percent Turkish students and 80 percent native students obtains the same 
diversity score as a school with 20 percent native students and 80 percent Turkish students. 
The specific ethnic composition of the track-within-school is therefore also important, and 
hence we used appropriate indicators (see below). 
 ESCS diversity. In a similar way, we calculated the sociocultural diversity of the 
tracks-within-schools. Using the ESCS scores of both native and migrant parents, we divided 
these parental scores into five categories; the group with the lowest 10 percent scores, the 10–
30 percent group; the 30–70 percent group; the 70–90 percent group, and the group with the 
highest 10 percent scores.xiii On the basis of these five categories, we calculated the 
Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity (varying between 0 and 1).xiv The index should be 
interpreted as follows: A value 0 means that there is no diversity, because all parents of all 
students at that particular track-within-school are in the same ESCS category. A value 
approaching 1 indicates a very high level of diversity, indicating that the students are equally 
recruited from the five ESCS categories. As this Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity is 
‘level-blind’ and therefore insensitive to the average parental educational level, we have also 
added the average ESCS of a school to the analysis (see below). 
 Percent students from migrant regions. As indicated above, the countries of origin 
were combined into five categories in order to simplify the presentation of the analysis. For 
each track-within-school, we calculated five indexes noting the percentage of students from 
each of the following five regions: Eastern Europe, non-Islamic Asia, Islamic countries, 
Western OECD countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa. These indexes are the necessary 
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counterparts of the Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity, which after all is ‘colour-blind’. 
Together, these indexes measure the combined effect of ethnic diversity and ethnic share. 
 Average ESCS. In addition, we calculated the average parental ESCS per track-within-
school. This index is the necessary counterpart of the Herfindahl index of sociocultural 
diversity, which is ‘level-blind’. Together, these indexes measure the combined effect of 
sociocultural diversity and sociocultural share. 
 Selective admittance of students to the school is a scale in the PISA data based on 
principals’ answers indicating whether admittance to their school was based on academic 
record and/or on recommendation. We divided the scale into three dummies: selective 
admittance, some selection, and no selection. Although these dummies are measured at the 
school level, we use them to control the amount of entrance selectivity at the track level. 
 Teacher shortage. The degree to which schools suffer a shortage of teachers is an 
index in the PISA data that indicates, according to the principals, to what extent education is 
hampered by a lack of qualified teachers for physics, mathematics, languages, or any other 
subjects. This index is based on answers given by the school principals. The average of this 
index for teacher shortage was set to zero for all destination countries and all students to 
ensure that the comparisons for this item show the result for the student in schools with an 
average shortage of teachers. Although this variable is measured at the school level, we will 
assume that it applies for each track within that school. 
 Student-staff ratio. The student-staff ratio (the number of students per member of staff 
per school) is based on the answer given by the school principals. The average for this ratio 
was set to zero for all destination countries and all students to ensure that the comparisons for 
this item show the result for the students in schools with an average student-staff ratio. 
Although this variable is measured at the school level, we will assume that it applies for each 
track within that school. 
 Urbanisation. Two dummies were constructed to indicate whether a school is located 
in a (large) city or in a rural area. Schools in an urbanised countryside or in (small) towns 
serve as the reference category. 
 Schoolsize. Number of students in the school. Although this variable is measured at 
the school level, we will assume that it applies for each track within that school. 
 Private public. Educational systems differ in the shares of public and private schools 
and in the degree of state grants for these private scores. Two dummies were constructed to 
separate private dependent and private independent schools from public schools. These 
variables control for these system differences and effectiveness of these school types 
(Dronkers & Avram, 2010a; 2010b). 
 
3.6. Variables Measured at the Country Level 
Stratification. To measure the level of differentiation of the educational system, we 
classified countries according to their stratification level. We define Austria, Switzerland, 
Germany, and Liechtenstein as highly stratified systems; Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and 
Luxembourg as moderately stratified systems; and Finland, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Australia, Scotland, and Latvia as comprehensive educational systems that are hardly 
stratified. Our division is based on information on the first age at which students must choose 
amongst different educational types, the number of school types students can choose amongst, 
and the presence of more hidden types of ability grouping (OECD, 2007; Heus & Dronkers, 
2010a). In the highly stratified countries, children can choose from at least 3 different 
educational types at age 10 (Germany, Austria), 11 (Liechtenstein), or 12 (Switzerland). In 
comprehensive systems, children are not tracked into different educational types before age 
15. We use dummy variables indicating whether countries have highly stratified, moderately 
stratified, or comprehensive educational systems. 
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Age of selection. Apart from these three dummies, age of selection is included in the 
analysis. 
 
 
4. Models 
 
The results of the multilevel analyses are displayed in Table 1. The analysis uses 
cross-classified multilevel regression analyses (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Tubergen, 2005), 
because the countries of origin and destination cannot be structured hierarchically. Because of 
the maximum of five levels in MlWin, we could not use schools as a separate level above the 
tracks-within-schools level. A cross-classified analysis for migrant students needs, apart from 
the four levels for pupils, tracks, schools, and destination countries, two more levels: one for 
the origin countries and the other for the cross-classified identification. However, six levels 
are impossible in MlWin. Therefore, this multilevel analysis has three hierarchical levels: 
countries of origin/destination, tracks-within-schools, and students. School characteristics are 
thus transferred to the tracks-within-schools level. 
 
Models 
 Model 0 is the empty model, which indicates how much variance is situated at the 
different levels. This model is important, because it shows a relatively high amount of 
variance is related to the tracks-within-schools level. In addition, it shows that a greater 
amount of variance is related to the country of origin than to the country of destination, 
underlining the importance of including the countries of origin for explaining achievement 
differences among migrant students. 
Model 1 includes the individual characteristics and the educational system 
characteristics, plus the interactions between the latter and parental ESCS. Thus, Model 1 
resembles the standard approach to the analysis of educational systems effects, with country-
level characteristics directly affecting educational performance. The only difference is that 
this model already contains the other distinguished levels such as the tracks-within-schools 
level, and the origin-country level. In order to estimate the relevance of our approach, we 
present in Appendix D the same Model 1 and the same data but with only two levels: students 
and countries of origin and destination. The omission of the tracks-within-schools level 
increases the amount of variance at the individual level. In addition, the parameters of the 
individual variables tend to be stronger in the simple country plus student model than in a 
comparable four-level model. Especially, the effects of parental ESCS are greater in the 
simple approach than in the more correct four-level approach. The interactions between 
parental ESCS and educational systems characteristics are more or less the same in both 
approaches. 
Model 2 adds social and ethnic composition variables at the tracks-within-school-level 
to the equation of Model 1: the shares of migrant students, the average parental ESCS, the 
ESCS and ethnic diversity, and two interaction terms between educational system and average 
parental ESCS. This model assumes that most of the variance at the tracks-within-schools-
level is related to the social and ethnic school composition and not to differences in the track’s 
curriculum. Model 2 comes closest to Dunne’s (2010) approach, who first introduced a school 
level between those of the educational system and the students. 
In Model 3, we add the curriculum characteristics of the track (vocational orientation 
of the track, the level of the track, and two dummies regarding selective admittance) as well 
as the interaction between the level of the track and the stratification of the educational 
system to the equation of Model 1. This model assumes that most of the variance at the 
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tracks-within-schools-level is related to differences in the track and not with the social and 
ethnic school composition. 
Model 4 combines Models 2 and 3 by adding the social and ethnic composition 
variables as well as the curriculum characteristics of the track. The results for Model 4 show 
that both aspects (composition and curriculum characteristics of the track) must included in 
the analysis in order to obtain a better fit with the data. Moreover, the parameters of 
composition and curriculum variables are significant in this combined inclusion in the 
equation. This model best reflects our new approach of including curriculum characteristics 
next to student characteristics, the social and ethnic school composition, and educational 
system characteristics. 
In Models 5 and 6, we add more school variables and interactions to the equation of 
Model 4 to ensure that the results of Model 4 are not biased by the omission of these variables 
and interactions. These additions do not substantially alter the results of Model 4. 
 
5. Main results 
 
<Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
Table 1 presents the outcomes of the different models for the migrant students. Table 2 
summarizes some of the main results of the outcomes of Model 6 in Table 1, especially the 
different effects of parental ESCS, ESCS school composition, and track level in the three 
educational systems. The baseline estimates for migrant students in Table 2 pertain to first-
generation migrant students from Western OECD countries whose home language is not the 
same as in the destination country and who have two non-native parents. The scores of the 
other migrant groups are obtained by simply looking at the estimates of Model 6 in Table 1. 
This means that we assume that the scores of these groups are linearly related to the scores of 
the migrant students of the Western OECD countries and that there is no interaction with the 
educational system characteristics. The scores for the students from Eastern Europe, non-
Islamic Asia, Islamic countries, and Sub-Saharan African countries were obtained by 
changing the scores for the migrant students from Western OECD countries with –8.2, +18.6, 
–35.3, and –15.0 respectively. This confirms the earlier findings by Dronkers (2010a) that 
students from non-Islamic Asia have an advantage when it comes to educational performance, 
compared with migrants from other origin countries. Students from Islamic countries have a 
substantial disadvantage in educational performance compared with other migrants and these 
results hold even when one uses a model that includes track characteristics and score, on 
average (holding constant for other characteristics), one-half a standard deviation lower their 
all students from non-Islamic Asia. The scores of second-generation migrant students were 
obtained by increasing these scores with +9.3; of those who use the same language as the 
destination country, with +24.2; and those with mixed parents, with +5.8. This again 
underscores the importance for migrant children to speak the same language at home as the 
destination country’s official language. To put it differently: migrant students from Islamic 
countries origin can make up their disadvantage compared with migrant students from 
Western OECD countries by speaking at home the official destination country’s language and 
by being second-generation instead of a first-generation migrant. 
 
5.1. The Differing Importance of Tracks in Different Educational Systems 
Our first hypothesis assumes that track levels explain a substantial part of the effect of 
ESCS school composition on achievement, but mostly in highly stratified educational 
systems, due to the institutionalized borders in these systems. If we compare the log 
likelihood of Model 4 in Table 1 with that of Model 2 (only school composition) and Model 3 
(only curriculum characteristics) we see that the log likelihood is lower in Model 4 than that 
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in Models 2 and 3. This supports our first hypothesis that track level explains a substantial 
part of the school composition effect and that the effects of curriculum characteristics should 
be distinguished from the effects of school composition. Compared with the log likelihood of 
Model 1 (only individual characteristics), however, the addition of school composition 
(Model 2) lowers the log likelihood more than the addition of curriculum characteristics 
(Model 3). This means that school composition can better explain variance in educational 
performance of migrant students than curriculum characteristics. 
 The interaction terms between track level and strongly or moderately stratified 
educational systems are positive and significant, in accordance with the first hypothesis. It 
means that for the higher level, less difference is found between educational systems. The 
main differences occur at the lower level. To illustrate: For migrant students at the low level, 
the difference between moderate and comprehensive systems is 41.1, to the advantage of the 
comprehensive system (Model 3 in Table 1), while for the higher level, this has changed into 
a slight positive advantage for the moderate stratified systems of +7.5 (–0.5, –41.1, +49.1). 
 
5.2. The Differing Importance of ESCS School Composition in Different Educational Systems. 
Our second hypothesis assumes that the positive effect of ESCS school composition 
on achievement is strongest in highly and moderately stratified systems, because ESCS school 
composition indicates both the curriculum level and ESCS neighbourhood composition, while 
ESCS school composition in comprehensive educational systems indicates only 
differentiation in ESCS neighbourhood composition. Model 2 in Table 1 (only school 
composition) shows that ESCS school composition has strong effects on educational 
achievement in all systems, but much more strongly in the moderately and highly stratified 
systems than in the comprehensive systems (positive effects of the interaction terms). 
However, after the inclusion of the curriculum variables (Model 4), these interaction effects 
remain significant only for the highly stratified systems. This indicates that part of the 
observed effect of the ESCS school composition is due to curriculum effects in accordance 
with our second hypothesis. The sole remaining effect of ESCS school composition is for 
migrants in highly stratified systems. 
 
5.3. The Differing Importance of Individual ESCS in Different Educational Systems. 
  Our third hypothesis assumes that the effect of individual ESCS on achievement is 
stronger in comprehensive systems. The lack of selection into hierarchical track levels forces 
parents of a more privileged socioeconomic class to use more of their cultural and social 
capital to ensure sufficient school performance at the end of secondary school. Table 1 shows 
that individual ESCS has strong effects on educational achievement.xv 
Table 2 shows that the effects of individual ESCS are weaker in moderately and 
strongly stratified educational systems, in accordance with our third hypothesis and Dunne’s 
(2010) results. Thus, her results cannot be explained by her omission of track level in her 
analyses. 
 
5.4. Migrants and Educational Systems. 
Our fourth hypothesis assumes that students with a migrant background achieve the 
greatest gains in either strongly stratified systems, because these provide them with clear 
information about their scholastic requirements or in comprehensive educational systems, 
because they do not have institutionalized curriculum borders that preclude high educational 
performance. The results of Table 2 support this expectation for the comprehensive 
educational systems, but not for strongly stratified systems. The achievement score of 
Western OECD first-generation migrant students is highest in comprehensive systems 
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(457.7), while their scores in the other two educational systems are slightly (but not 
significantly) lower (441.0). The same holds true for the other migrant groups. 
 
Even so, these results hold true only for average students, not for various subgroups. 
Table 3 gives the estimated reading scores for students with the lowest and highest parental 
ESCS scores in schools with the lowest and highest average ESCS school composition in the 
three educational systems for the different immigration groups. As indicated above, the results 
pertain to first-generation migrant students whose home language is not the same as in the 
destination country and who have two non-native parents.xvi The results indicate that migrant 
students from high ESCS parents perform best in schools with a high ESCS composition in 
comprehensive systems. This result holds for all tracks (vocational lower, general lower, and 
general higher). These students perform poorest in schools with a low ESCS composition in 
strongly stratified systems. The situation is quite different for the students with low ESCS 
parents. They perform best in schools with a high ESCS composition in strongly stratified 
systems, and they perform poorest in schools with a low ESCS composition in comprehensive 
systems. This result holds again for all tracks (vocational lower, general lower, and general 
higher). In other words, migrant students from different ESCS backgrounds do not experience 
the same educational opportunities and constraints in the different educational systems. A 
generic educational policy for these different groups might therefore produce different 
outcomes for students from low and high ESCS parents. 
 
5.5. Reproduction 
Our fifth hypothesis assumes that the interaction effect of individual ESCS and ESCS 
school composition on achievement is positive and equal in all educational systems, because 
this combination of individual and school composition ESCS is an indicator of a higher level 
of unmeasured cultural and financial capital of both parents and schools. The basic idea is that 
individual and school ESCS reinforce each other, which will show up in a positive interaction 
term. Yet Model 6 in Table 1 shows that this hypothesis is not supported by our analysis. 
Although this result does not directly invalidate the reproduction theory, it does invalidate 
some of its strong claims, such as the reinforcement effect. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
6.1. The Importance of Track Level. 
The first conclusion of this paper is that an analysis of the effects of educational 
systems is flawed if it uses only a country- and a student level. Additional tracks-within-
school levels are necessary in order to get reliable estimators of system- and individual 
effects. Appendix D shows that the omission of the tracks-within-schools level increases the 
amount of variance at the individual level compared with four-level models. Further, the 
effects of the individual variables tend to be stronger in the model with only countries and 
students than in a comparable four-level model. Especially, the effects of parental ESCS are 
greater in the simple approach than those found in the more accurate four-level approach. The 
interactions between parental ESCS and educational system characteristics are more or less 
the same in both approaches. Finally, the fit of four-level models is far better than that of the 
simple models, indicating that the simple model gives a less adequate description of the 
relations between educational systems and educational achievement than does a four-level 
model. As a consequence, the outcomes of the simple country and student models, which 
remain dominant in the study of educational system effects, are flawed. 
 
! ")!
6.2 Partial Confirmation of the Earlier Results by Dunne (2010). 
Our analysis confirmed the results of Dunne (2010) concerning the differential effects 
of parental background in different educational systems. The direct effect of parental ESCS is 
strongest in comprehensive systems, and weakest in moderately and strongly stratified 
educational systems, as well as after inclusion of the track level within the schools, the origin 
countries of migrant students, and the ethnic school diversity. 
However, Dunne’s results concerning the effects of average school ESCS are not 
confirmed. Without control for curriculum characteristics, average school ESCS effects are 
significantly greater in more stratified systems. After control for curriculum characteristics, 
however, average school ESCS effects in more stratified systems are no longer significant in 
the case of moderately stratified systems and significant only in the case of highly stratified 
systems. 
 
6.3. Different Effects of Curriculum. 
The inclusion of the track level is necessary to avoid overestimation of the school-
composition effect, especially in stratified educational systems. Our results show that the 
track level effect is absent in comprehensive educational system, while it is significant and 
positive in all stratified educational systems. In other words, curriculum level makes sense in 
stratified educational systems. Table 2 shows the consequences of this distinction between 
track levels. In a comprehensive system, the average reading score for migrant students from 
Western OECD countries is 457.7 for students at the lower track level and 456.9 at the higher 
level. Note that no difference is observed between the higher and lower level in the 
comprehensive system, because countries code their systems differently from one another (see 
Section 3). In moderately stratified systems, the scores are 441.0 and 472.9, and in strongly 
stratified systems, 441.0 and 456.5. Attaining the higher track level is thus important for 
educational achievement in the stratified systems. Not taking the track level into account will 
give biased and flawed outcomes in analyses of effects of both educational systems and 
school composition. The table shows that no educational system can claim to have the best 
results for all students, but rather that results differ for the different track levels. For migrant 
students at the lower level, the comprehensive system is clearly superior to the two others. For 
students at the higher level, the situation is clearly different. Migrant students at this level 
realise the highest achievements in the moderately stratified systems. 
 
6.4. A Negative Effect of Vocational Education? 
Students with a vocational oriented curriculum have lower reading scores than do 
students in a general oriented curriculum, and that lower score is not easily explained by the 
social and cultural characteristics of these students, their schools, or their educational systems. 
Despite all the control variables in Model 6 of Table 1, students with a vocational oriented 
curriculum score 54 points lower than do students in a general oriented curriculum. Appendix 
E shows that the differences in student scores in both vocational oriented curricula and 
general oriented curricula for math and science are more or less the same. These equal 
differences do not support the explanation as a consequence of choosing between more 
technical and cultural preferences and/or abilities of students. A possible explanation for these 
equal differences is that students in both general and vocational curricula differ strongly in 
scholastic ability, and for that reason, perform differently on all school tests, irrespective of 
their content (Rindermann & Ceci, 2009). Further analyses (not shown here) indicate that 
these lower scores of students with a vocational oriented curriculum occur across all 
educational systems, but that in moderately stratified systems, these students score around 35 
points lower than in the other systems. 
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6.5. Direct and Indirect Effects of Parental Background. 
The direct effects of parental ESCS on reading scores are smaller in both moderately 
and strongly stratified educational systems than they are in comprehensive systems. Yet the 
bivariate correlations between parental ESCS and reading scores are more or less equal in the 
three systems: 0.36, 0.35, and 0.39, respectively. The analogous partial correlations, 
controlled for ESCS school composition, are 0.23, 0.14, and 0.16, respectively. This 
difference between the bivariate correlations and partial correlations can be partly explained 
by the different bivariate correlations between parental ESCS and ESCS school composition 
in the three educational systems: 0.47, 0.48, and 0.49. In other words, the influence of 
parental ESCS on the entrance selection of students into different tracks and schools is higher 
in stratified systems, because the long-term consequences of that selection are more severe 
than in comprehensive systems in which there is no selection. Without that entrance selection 
into different schools and tracks, the influence of parental ESCS is greater in comprehensive 
systems, because the social background effect has not yet been transformed into different 
tracking or ability grouping. 
 
6.6 The Effects of Origin for Migrant Students and Educational Systems. 
Estimates of educational system effects will be flawed if they fail to account for 
migrant students’ different origin countries in different destination countries and the different 
levels of ethnic school-diversity in different destination countries. By not accounting for 
migrant students’ countries of origin, the positive effects of comprehensive systems will be 
overestimated, because the Scandinavian countries with comprehensive systems have 
relatively few migrant students originating from Islamic countries. Further, the negative 
effects of strongly stratified systems will be overestimated by the non-inclusion of origin 
countries, because Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland have relatively many 
migrant students originating from Islamic countries. These flaws are made in influential 
OECD reports like Where Immigrant Students Succeed; A Comparative Review of 
Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003 (OECD, 2006), despite the fact that country of 
origin is already available in PISA 2003. 
Migrant students originating from Islamic countries experience lower educational 
achievement than equivalent migrant children originating from other countries. Multiple 
explanations may be proposed: a discriminating attitude directed towards migrant students 
from Islamic countries; negative selectiveness of guest worker programmes wherein most 
guest workers in Europe came from Islamic countries; values and standards of the current 
Islam that are less suitable for success in modern societies (honour, unequal gender roles). 
André, Dronkers, and Fleischmann (2009) have used data from the European Social Survey 
(ESS)xvii to show that the degree of subjective feelings regarding discrimination of migrants in 
the European Union who practice an Islamic religion is not greater than that of Greek 
Orthodox or Jewish believers. Dronkers and Heus (2010a) have shown that the negative 
selectiveness of migrants from Turkey is not greater than that from non-Islamic guest worker 
countries (Yugoslavia, Italy, and Portugal). Dronkers and Fleischmann (2010) have shown on 
the basis of the same ESS data that second-generation male Islam believers in Europe obtain a 
lower educational level than do comparable migrants practicing different religions. In 
addition, we have shown that it is practice of the Islamic faith of individual migrants that may 
lead to a lower educational level, not that they have originated from a country with an Islamic 
majority. 
Migrant students originating from Non-Islamic Asian countries experience higher 
educational achievement than equivalent migrant children who originate from other countries. 
The standard explanations for this advantage (working harder for education; authoritarian 
education system; the ‘ideal migrant’) do not stand up empirically (see Dronkers & Heus, 
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2010b). East Asia is therefore a much greater challenge for Europe in the education field than 
the United States (see also Dronkers, 2010b). These earlier results are not changed by the 
improved measurement of the concrete school environment and its characteristics by the 
tracks-within-school level. 
 
6.7. Caveats. 
Finally, we want to issue two caveats in relation to our results. The first is a 
consequence of the need to control for migrant students’ origin countries to obtain a more 
accurate estimate of educational system effects. Doing so requires the inclusion of more 
destination countries, both inside and outside of Europe. Important countries to take into 
account, for instance, would be Canada, England, France, and the United States. Only 16 of 
the OECD countries participating in PISA 2006 have asked sufficiently detailed information 
about the country of birth of students and their parents, and very few additional countries have 
done that in PISA 2009. This is not only a drawback in determining in the most accurate 
scientific analysis of migrant students’ educational achievement, but it is also socially and 
politically irresponsible to deny or ignore the importance of origin countries (see, for instance, 
EU Commission, 2008). 
The second caveat is that the quality of the measurement of the track level students 
attend must be improved, especially for countries with comprehensive educational systems 
(compare the levels of Scotland with that of Finland). Finally, the internal differentiation 
within schools (track, streams, etc) should be measured better than now possible with the 
PISA data. 
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,!More detailed information on the analysis of this paper is provided in Dronkers, Dunne, and Van der Velden 
(2011). Direct all correspondence to the first author: j.dronkers@maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
ii It is important to distinguish both countries of destination and countries of origin. Omitting the latter from the 
analysis would give misleading results (Swedish and Russian migrants in Finland with a comprehensive system 
and Turkish and Yugoslav migrants in Germany with a strongly differentiated system cannot be treated as the 
same migrants, even after controlling for all measured background characteristics). 
iii This section is primarily based on Dunne (2010) and Heus and Dronkers (2010). 
iv We could not use the same countries, because a number of them collected no information about the birth 
countries of the students and their parents. 
v For a similar analysis for native students, see Dronkers, Dunne, and Van der Velden (2011).  
vi The question on country of birth was not asked in a similar way in all countries. Most countries asked about 
the country of origin for the main migrant groups in the country concerned. In the German questionnaires, 
possible countries of origin were therefore: Russia, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Turkey, 
whereas the Scottish questionnaire listed the options China, India, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Europe. See also Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp (2008). 
vii Because PISA allows participating countries to determine the country of origin categories themselves, the 
level of detail differs among countries. As a result, the countries of origin that we have identified are dependent 
on the quality of the answer categories. To take this into consideration, we have compared the countries of origin 
that we defined with national statistics. In the case of Australia, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
and Switzerland, the three main groups of migrants, as listed by their national statistics, match countries of origin 
that we found. In the case of Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Scotland, the two main groups, as indicated 
by their national statistics, match the countries of origin identified by us. In Greece, the main group of foreign 
origin consists of Albanians (42 percent of all migrants, Eurostat, 2008), and this finding also matches our data. 
The main group of foreign origin in Latvia concerns Russians (35 percent of all migrants, Eurostat, 2008), and 
this is also reflected in our data. 
viii We also checked whether centring the track level per country would solve this problem. The centred values 
are displayed in the last column of Appendix B, and the results of using centred values instead of the measured 
track levels are shown in Appendix F. In general, the results do not change much, which is the reason we 
decided to use the original track levels.  
ix The measure consists of the presence of a desk, a private room, a quiet place to study, a computer, educational 
software, Internet access, literature or poetry, art, books that may be of use when doing schoolwork, a dictionary, 
a dishwasher, and the presence of more than 100 books in the house. 
x The number of migrants’ children from Latin America is too small to justify a separate region.  
xi The Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity was calculated as follows: 1–((percentage of ethnic group 1)2 + 
(percentage of ethnic group 2)2 + … + (percentage of ethnic group n)2).  
xii For the computation of the ethnic diversity, we used the countries of origins, not the regions of origins. 
xiii The groups are defined as follows: 1. Less than 10 percent: ESCS <= –1.1; 2. 10–30 percent: –1.0 < ESCS <= 
–0.4; 3. 30–70 percent: –0.3 < ESCS <= 0.6; 4. 70–90 percent: 0.7 < ESCS <= 1.2; 5. more than 90 percent: 
ESCS >= 1.3. 
xiv The Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity was calculated as follows: 1–((percentage of parents from 
ESCS group 1) 2 + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 2) 2 + … + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 
5) 2).  
-.!These individual ESCS effects tend to be a little bit smaller for migrant students than for the native students 
(see Dronkers, Dunne, and Van der Velden, 2011). Individual ESCS of migrants might be a poorer indicator of 
their resources (ability, social, cultural) than for native parents. Further, the positive selection of migrants due to 
the obstacles and challenges of migration might explain this lower effect of individual ESCS on migrant 
students’ achievement (Feliciano, 2005; Dronkers & Heus, 2010a).!
xvi For an overview of the underlying parameters, see Appendix G. 
xvii The ESS contains information about the respondents’ individual religion.!
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Table 1: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school characteristics, 
and educational system characteristics on reading score of migrant students (N origin=35; N 
destination=15; N tracks=1,960; N students=8,521). 
 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 470.6 
(8.2) 
502.0 
(46.2) 
446.4 
(43.3) 
488.3 
(45.2) 
465.2 
(43.6) 
457.5 
(44.2) 
457.7 
(44.2) 
Individual characteristics        
Parental ESCS  32.9** 
(2.0) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
33.4** 
(2.0) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
24.9** 
(2.1) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
 –7.0 
(7.4) 
–10.1 
(7.1) 
–5.9 
(6.9) 
–6.8 (6.8) –8.2 (6.8) –8.2 (6.8) 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 35.3** 
(11.2) 
17.2 
(10.5) 
32.2** 
(10.5) 
18.8* 
(10.2) 
18.7* 
(10.2) 
18.6* 
(10.2) 
Islamic countries origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 –38.2** 
(9.3) 
–35.7** 
(8.8) 
–38.9** 
(8.7) 
–35.1** 
(8.4) 
–35.3** 
(8.4) 
–35.3** 
(8.4) 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 –22.7 
(16.0) 
–13.9 
(14.9) 
–25.6* 
(14.9) 
–15.8 
(14.3) 
–15.0 
(14.2) 
–15.0 
(14.2) 
Female  30.6** 
(1.7) 
29.9** 
(1.6) 
28.5** 
(1.7) 
28.5** 
(1.6) 
28.6** 
(1.6) 
28.6** 
(1.6) 
Home language same as in 
destination country 
 26.1** 
(2.3) 
24.3** 
(2.2) 
25.5** 
(2.2) 
24.2** 
(2.2) 
24.2** 
(2.2) 
24.2** 
(2.2) 
One parent migrant, other parent 
native 
 4.8 (4.0) 6.1 (3.8) 4.8 (3.9) 5.4 (3.8) 5.8 (3.8) 5.8 (3.8) 
Second-generation migrant  9.2** 
(1.9) 
9.7** 
(1.9) 
8.5** 
(1.9) 
9.3** 
(1.8) 
9.4** 
(1.8) 
9.3** 
(1.8) 
Grade (destination-country centred)  40.5** 
(1.6) 
32.3** 
(1.6) 
35.1** 
(1.9) 
32.3** 
(1.8) 
31.8** 
(1.8) 
31.8** 
(1.8) 
School-composition 
characteristics at tracks-within-
school 
       
Average ESCS   49.8** 
(4.8) 
 49.0** 
(4.7) 
46.8** 
(5.1) 
46.9** 
(5.1) 
% students from Eastern Europe 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.3 (0.2)  0.3 (0.2) 0.4** 
(0.2) 
0.4** 
(0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia 
(ref=% native students) 
  1.4** 
(0.2) 
 1.3** 
(0.2) 
1.2** 
(0.2) 
1.2** 
(0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.2 (0.1)  0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 
% students from Western OECD 
countries (ref=% native students) 
  –0.1 (0.1)  0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
% students from Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ref=% native students) 
  –0.2 (0.4)  –0.1 (0.4) –0.2 (0.4) –0.2 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity    45.5** 
(14.1) 
 22.9 
(13.9) 
20.4 
(13.9) 
20.0 
(14.0) 
Ethnic diversity    –36.1** 
(11.4) 
 –36.9** 
(11.0) 
–40.1** 
(11.2) 
–40.3** 
(11.2) 
Curriculum at tracks-within-
school 
       
Vocational (ref=general)    –85.8** 
(4.5) 
–54.5** 
(4.6) 
–54.1** 
(4.6) 
–54.1** 
(4.6) 
Higher secondary (ref=lower)    –0.5 
(5.2) 
0.5 (4.9) –0.7 (4.9) –0.8 (4.9) 
Selective admittance (ref=some 
selective admittance) 
   21.4** 
(3.0) 
17.7** 
(2.7) 
18.0** 
(2.8) 
18.0** 
(2.8) 
Non-selective admittance (ref=some 
selective admittance) 
   0.2 (2.6) 2.2 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) 
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Table 1: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school characteristics, 
and educational system characteristics on reading score of migrant students (N origin=35; N 
destination=15; N tracks=1,960; N students=8,521). (cont.) !
School characteristics        
Teacher shortage      –1.6 (1.1) –1.6 (1.1) 
Student/staff ratio      0.8** 
(0.3) 
0.8** 
(0.3) 
School in city (ref=towns)      2.7 (2.7) 2.7 (2.7) 
School in rural (ref=towns)      2.7 (2.7) 2.7 (2.7) 
School size*100      0.7** 
(0.2) 
0.7** 
(0.2) 
Private dependent 
(ref=public school) 
     –5.0 (3.7) –4.9 (3.7) 
Private independent 
(ref=public school) 
     –6.6 (5.4) –6.4 (5.4) 
Educational system 
characteristics 
       
Strongly stratified 
(ref=comprehensive) 
 –28.8* 
(15.4) 
–9.6 (14.4) –41.1** 
(15.0) 
–15.4 
(14.4) 
–16.7 
(14.5) 
–16.7 
(14.5) 
Moderately stratified 
(ref=comprehensive) 
 –25.3* 
(13.6) 
–10.3 
(12.6) 
–41.1** 
(13.6) 
–20.1 
(13.0) 
–16.7 
(13.1) 
–16.7 
(13.1) 
Age of selection  –3.1 (2.8) –1.8 (2.6) –2.1 (2.8) –2.1 (2.6) –2.3 (2.6) –2.3 (2.6) 
Interactions with 
educational systems 
       
Parental ESCS* strongly 
stratified 
 –16.1** 
(2.4) 
–16.5** 
(2.5) 
–18.5** 
(2.3) 
–16.5** 
(2.4) 
–16.4** 
(2.4) 
–16.5** 
(2.5) 
Parental ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
 –14.1** 
(3.2) 
–15.8** 
(3.3) 
–21.5** 
(3.2) 
–16.3** 
(3.3) 
–16.3** 
(3.3) 
–16.5** 
(3.3) 
Average ESCS* strongly 
stratified 
  29.8** 
(5.9) 
 18.1** 
(5.9) 
19.6** 
(6.1) 
19.5** 
(6.2) 
Average ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
  18.4** 
(7.7) 
 –11.8 
(8.0) 
–10.8 
(8.3) 
–11.0 
(8.3) 
Higher secondary* strongly 
stratified 
   53.1** 
(6.7) 
16.1** 
(6.5) 
16.1** 
(6.5) 
16.3** 
(6.5) 
Higher secondary* 
moderately stratified 
   49.1** 
(10.1) 
31.3** 
(9.8) 
32.8** 
(9.8) 
32.7** 
(9.8) 
Reproduction         
Parental ESCS* average 
ESCS 
      –0.5 (1.8) 
Variation        
Individual level 5,034.3 
(104.9) 
4,599.5 
(94.1) 
4,506.7 
(89.8) 
4,547.0 
(91.8) 
4,520.7 
(89.1) 
4,516.2 
(89.0) 
4,516.2 
(89.0) 
Tracks-within-school level 3,338.4 
(155.9) 
1,941.0 
(114.2) 
1,129.0 
(89.6) 
1,481.4 
(100.7) 
931.5 
(83.4) 
917.3 
(82.8) 
917.1 
(82.8) 
Origin-country level 1,875.4 
(256.9) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
384.9 
(1,719.4) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
 000.0 
(00.0) 
 000.0 
(00.0) 
Destination-country level 000.0 
(00.0) 
581.4 
(120.7) 
112.6 
(1,718.0) 
504.2 
(104.5) 
455.7 
(93.6) 
444.8 
(91.8) 
444.6 
(91.7) 
Log likelihood 100,118 98,448 97,536 97,951 97,339 97,315 97,314 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Table 2: Summary of the different effects of parental ESCS, average ESCS school 
composition, and track level in different educational systems. 
  
 Comprehensive Moderately  Strongly 
Western OECD countries 457.7 441.0 441.0 
    
Eastern Europe origin –8.2 –8.2 –8.2 
Non-Islamic Asia origin +18.6 +18.6 +18.6 
Islamic countries origin –35.3 –35.3 –35.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin –15.0 –15.0 –15.0 
    
Home language same as in destination country +24.2 
 
+24.2 
 
+24.2 
 
One parent migrant, other parent native +5.8 
 
+5.8 
 
+5.8 
 
Second-generation migrant +9.3 +9.3 +9.3 
    
1 s.d. increase in Parental ESCS* +25.0 +8.5 +8.5 
1.s.d. increase in School ESCS* +23.5 +17.9 +31.6 
Track level higher instead of lower* –0.8 +31.9 +15.5 
Vocational instead of general –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation. * Indicates effects that are allowed to differ between educational systems (interaction 
effects). 
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Table 3: Estimation of educational performance of first-generation migrants with lowest and 
highest parental ESCS, in schools with lowest and highest ESCS composition and with 
different track level in the three educational systems, based on Model 6 of Table 1. 
 
School lowest parent  
highest 
parent 
lowest 
parent 
highest 
parent 
lowest 
parent highest parent 
ESCS ESCS & ESCS & ESCS & ESCS & ESCS & ESCS & 
composition vocational vocational general general general general 
  & lower & lower & lower & lower & higher & higher 
Western OECD countries 
Comprehensive Lowest  199 385 246 439 254 447 
 Highest  374 553 428 607 427 606 
Moderately Lowest  259 323 307 378 346 416 
 Highest  412 469 466 523 498 555 
Strongly  Lowest  214 278 262 332 277 348 
 Highest  462 519 516 573 532 588 
Eastern Europe origin 
Comprehensive Lowest  191 377 238 431 246 439 
 Highest  366 545 420 599 419 598 
Moderately Lowest  251 315 299 370 338 408 
 Highest  404 461 458 515 490 547 
Strongly  Lowest  206 270 254 324 269 340 
 Highest  454 511 508 565 524 580 
Non-Islamic Asia origin 
Comprehensive Lowest  218 404 265 458 273 466 
 Highest  393 572 447 626 446 625 
Moderately Lowest  278 342 326 397 365 435 
 Highest  431 488 485 542 517 574 
Strongly  Lowest  233 297 281 351 296 367 
 Highest  481 538 535 592 551 607 
Islamic countries origin 
Comprehensive Lowest  164 350 211 404 219 412 
 Highest  339 518 393 572 392 571 
Moderately Lowest  224 288 272 343 311 381 
 Highest  377 434 431 488 463 520 
Strongly  Lowest  179 243 227 297 242 313 
 Highest  427 484 481 538 497 553 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin 
Comprehensive Lowest  184 370 231 424 239 432 
 Highest  359 538 413 592 412 591 
Moderately Lowest  244 308 292 363 331 401 
 Highest  397 454 451 508 483 540 
Strongly  Lowest  199 263 247 317 262 333 
 Highest  447 504 501 558 517 573 
        
Source: PISA 2006; own computation. The average scores of second-generation migrant students can be found by changing 
the scores with+9.3, of those who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2, and those with mixed parents 
with +5.8. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics for migrant students. 
 
 Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Science 130.30 841.04 468.6504 103.36225 
Math 154.92 790.07 479.8127 94.65479 
Reading 67.34 775.21 462.9986 102.80869 
Average ESCS school –2.07 1.64 .0345 .50160 
Diversity ESCS .00 .79 .6635 .07145 
Diversity ethnic .03 .84 .4149 .19621 
% Western OECD  .00 100.00 14.7488 18.62151 
% Eastern Europe  .00 66.67 7.9945 12.80759 
% Islamic countries  .00 92.31 5.9732 13.45775 
% non-Islamic Asia  .00 87.50 2.5286 8.11845 
% Sub-Saharan Africa .00 33.33 1.1262 3.09810 
Vocational orientation of 
school 
.00 1.00 .0817 .27389 
Level of track .00 1.00 .3441 .47506 
Level of track centred –1.00 1.00 –.2881 .90094 
School size 23 4468 845.77 629.165 
Teacher-student ratio .889 36.588 11.69007 3.942775 
Teacher shortage –1.0568 3.6194 .287914 .9777337 
School in rural area .00 1.00 .2949 .45603 
School in city .00 1.00 .3717 .48328 
School admittance not 
selective 
.00 1.00 .2732 .44011 
School admittance selective .00 1.00 .2259 .41509 
Private independent school .00 1.00 .0501 .21819 
Private dependent school .00 1.00 .2402 .42725 
Public school .00 1.00 .7097 .45395 
Female .00 1.00 .5008 .50003 
ESCS  –4.4421 2.9709 –.232409 1.0159425 
Migrant first generation .00 1.00 .4605 .49847 
Migrant second generation .00 1.00 .5003 .50003 
Mixed marriage .00 1.00 .0563 .23057 
Eastern Europe .00 1.00 .2746 .44635 
Western OECD .00 1.00 .4538 .49789 
Islamic country .00 1.00 .1620 .36843 
Non-Islamic Asia .00 1.00 .0908 .28739 
Sub-Saharan Africa .00 1.00 .0354 .18490 
Language of destination .00 1.00 .4995 .50003 
Grade (destination-country 
centred) 
–2.00 3.00 .3732 .87115 
Strongly stratified system .00 1.00 .5645 .49585 
Moderately stratified system .00 1.00 .1402 .34726 
Age of first selection 10.00 16.00 13.2238 2.08364 
Valid N 8,521    
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix B: The number of schools and number of tracks-within-schools and the number of 
students in these tracks-within-schools (Number of students of track-within-school >5). 
 
Country Level N 
tracks-
within-
schools 
Minimum N 
students per 
track-within-
school 
Maximum N 
students per 
track-within-
school 
Average N 
students per 
track-
within-
school 
Level 
centred per 
country and 
general/ 
vocational 
 lower general 345 6 56 31.87 –1  
 higher general 133 6 33 16.37 + 1 
Australia 
 higher vocational 10 6 19 9.10 0 
 lower general 11 6 26 9.64 –1  
 higher general 88 6 35 29.51 + 1 
Austria 
 higher vocational 79 8 38 26.06 0 
 lower general 8 6 18 8.50 –1  
 lower vocational 12 6 29 14.33 –1  
 higher general 250 6 161 26.76 + 1 
Belgium 
 higher vocational 113 6 66 12.64 + 1 
 lower general 458 6 175 23.61 –1  
 higher general 37 6 34 16.57 + 1 
Switzerland 
 higher vocational 17 6 33 15.94 0 
 lower vocational 3 9 17 10.0 –1 
 lower general 118 9 25 20.20 0 
 higher vocational 5 8 25 15.40 0 
Germany 
 higher general 96 6 25 20.59 +1 
 lower general 201 6 28 21.64 –1  Denmark 
 higher general 2 6 7 6.50 + 1 
Finland  lower general 154 7 35 30.24 0 
Scotland  higher general 98 9 34 23.84 0 
 lower general 11 6 27 11.64 –1  
 higher general 125 8 35 30.66 + 1 
Greece 
 higher vocational 29 7 34 23.93 0 
 lower general 11 6 77 27.18 –1  Liechtenstein 
 higher general 2 11 26 18.50 + 1 
 lower general 28 11 205 96.71 –1  
 higher general 27 6 125 49.33 + 1 
Luxembourg 
 higher vocational 14 6 32 16.64 0 
 lower general 171 7 35 26.25 0 Latvia 
 higher vocational 7 6 21 9.86 0 
 lower general 191 6 30 23.28 –1  Norway 
 higher general 1 7 7 7.00 + 1 
 lower general 3 6 12 9.00 –1  New Zealand 
 higher general 168 10 50 24.43 + 1 
 lower general 123 6 37 16.41 –1  
 lower vocational 6 6 17 9.83 –1  
 higher general 111 6 37 18.14 + 1 
Portugal 
 higher vocational 47 6 34 9.57 + 1 
Total natives Schools 2,861     
 Tracks-within-
schools 
3,311     
Migrants Schools 1,756     
 Tracks-within-
schools 
1,960     
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. The characteristics of schools and tracks-within-schools are based on all students, not 
just the migrant students. 
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Appendix C. Average reading score of migrant students per country of destination and 
country of origin (N=8,521). 
 
Destination countries 
Origin countries AU AT BE CH DE DK EL FI LI LU LV NO NZ PT SC Mean 
Albania  422  353   433  312       399 
Australia             551   551 
Austria    478     534       501 
Bangladesh               453 453 
Belarus           486     486 
Belgium          521      521 
Bosnia Herzegovina  457   459 445          454 
Brazil              466  466 
Cape Verde          368      368 
China 544 574           538 456 461 539 
Congo   437             437 
Croatia  469   432           459 
Czech republic  560              560 
Denmark            394    394 
Estonia        485        485 
France   452 504     439 493      485 
Germany  525 502 530     529 520      519 
Greece     412           412 
Hungary  567              567 
India 539              494 538 
Italy    451 410    447 432      443 
Korea 499            512   506 
Liechtenstein    464            464 
Macedonia  401   413           403 
Morocco   442             442 
Netherlands   489             489 
New Zealand 498               498 
Pakistan      408         446 423 
Philippines 512               512 
Poland  532 430  488           469 
Portugal    460     450 416      426 
Romania  444              444 
Russia     462   562   463     472 
Samoa             443   443 
Serbia Montenegro  430  427 397   413        426 
Slovakia  515              515 
Slovenia  428   447           432 
South Africa 527               527 
Spain    467     517       469 
Sweden        497    451    462 
Switzerland         501       501 
Turkey  386 411 433 400 398   359       408 
Ukraine           447     447 
United Kingdom 523            554   532 
United States 559               559 
Vietnam 505               505 
Mean migrants 523 445 451 444 430 412 433 532 482 440 465 429 520 465 456 463 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix D: The effects of individual characteristics and educational system characteristics 
(Model 6 in Table 1) on reading scores of migrant in analyses with 4 or 2 levels. 
 
 Model 1; 4 levels Model 1; 2 levels Only ESCS & female 
Constant 502.0 (46.2) 478.9 (75.8) 465.8 (9.7) 
Individual characteristics    
Parental ESCS 32.9** (2.0) 39.1** (2.0) 40.7** (1.9)  
Eastern Europe origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –7.0 (7.4) –9.8** (3.0) - 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref=Western OECD countries) 35.3** (11.2) 35.1** (3.9) - 
Islamic countries origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –38.2** (9.3) –33.4** (3.3) - 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –22.7 (16.0) –22.1** (5.0) - 
Female 30.6** (1.7) 31.7** (1.8) 36.2** (1.9) 
Home language same as in destination country 26.1** (2.3) 26.8** (2.2) - 
One parent migrant, other parent native 4.8 (4.0) 8.9** (4.1) - 
Second-generation migrant 9.2** (1.9) 7.9** (2.0) - 
Grade (destination-country centred) 40.5** (1.6) 46.0** (1.6) - 
Educational system characteristics    
Strongly stratified (ref=comprehensive) –28.8* (15.4) –19.4 (24.4) –21.4 (13.5) 
Moderately stratified (ref=comprehensive) –25.3* (13.6) –8.5 (17.7) –32.2* (16.4)  
Age of selection –3.1 (2.8) –2.2 (4.7) - 
Interactions with educational systems    
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified –16.1** (2.4) –14.4** (2.3) –2.3 (2.5) 
Parental ESCS* moderately stratified –14.1** (3.2) –16.2** (3.1) –5.9 (3.3) 
Variation    
Individual-level 4,599.5 (94.1) 6,687.1 (102.5) 7,762.6 (119.1) 
Tracks-within-school level 1,941.0 (114.2) - - 
School level - - - 
Origin-country level 000.0 (00.0) - - 
Destination-country level 581.4 (120.7) 439.2 (176.6) 458.3 (195.9) 
Log likelihood 98,448 99,279 100,549 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix E: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school 
characteristics, educational system characteristics (Model 6) on reading, math and science 
scores of migrant students. 
 
 Reading Math Science 
Constant 457.7 (44.2) 502.9 (38.4) 553.6 (44.2) 
Individual characteristics    
Parental ESCS 25.0** (2.1) 22.4** (1.9) 24.7** (2.1) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –8.2 (6.8) –15.9** (5.9) –11.1 (6.8) 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref=Western OECD countries) 18.6* (10.2) 27.7** (8.8) 19.1 (10.2) 
Islamic countries origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –35.3** (8.4) –31.9** (7.2) –36.0** (8.4) 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –15.0 (14.2) –18.1 (12.1) –14.3 (14.3) 
Female 28.6** (1.6) –20.7** (1.5) –9.9** (1.6) 
Home language same as in destination country 24.2** (2.2) 16.2** (2.0) 23.0** (2.2) 
One parent migrant, other parent native 5.8 (3.8) 5.9 (3.5) 10.2** (3.8) 
Second-generation migrant 9.3** (1.8) 8.0** (1.7) 7.5** (1.9) 
Grade (destination-country centred) 31.8** (1.8) 33.6** (1.7) 31.7** (1.8) 
School-composition characteristics at tracks-within-school    
Average ESCS 46.9** (5.1) 43.5** (4.7) 50.5** (5.1) 
% students from Eastern Europe (ref=% native students) 0.4** (0.2) 0.3** (0.1) 0.3* (0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia (ref=% native students) 1.2** (0.2) 1.2** (0.2) 1.3** (0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries (ref=% native students) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
% students from Western OECD countries (ref=% native students) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.2* (0.1) 
% students from Sub-Saharan Africa (ref=% native students) –0.2 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) –0.2 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity  20.0 (14.0) 17.0 (13.0) 23.1 (13.9) 
Ethnic diversity  –40.3** (11.2) –34.4** (10.4) –42.6** (11.0) 
Curriculum at tracks-within-school    
Vocational (ref=general) –54.1** (4.6) –52.4** (4.3) –50.1** (4.5) 
Higher secondary (ref=lower) –0.8 (4.9) –0.4 (4.5) 0.9 (4.9) 
Selective admittance (ref=some selective admittance) 18.0** (2.8) 18.9** (2.6) 19.5** (2.7) 
Non-selective admittance (ref=some selective admittance) 1.0 (2.4) 1.2 (2.2) 0.8 (2.4) 
School characteristics    
Teacher shortage –1.6 (1.1) –2.6** (1.0) –1.5 (1.1) 
Student/staff ratio 0.8** (0.3) 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0.3) 
School in city (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) –0.3 (2.5) 1.5 (2.7) 
School in rural (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 4.1 (2.5) 5.9** (2.6) 
School size*100 0.7** (0.2) 0.7** (0.2) 0.6** (0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=public school) –4.9 (3.7) –10.7** (3.4) –6.0* (3.6) 
Private independent (ref=public school) –6.4 (5.4) –10.3** (5.0) –4.5 (5.4) 
Educational system characteristics    
Strongly stratified (ref=comprehensive) –16.7 (14.5) –17.0 (12.5) –43.9** (14.5) 
Moderately stratified (ref=comprehensive) –16.7 (13.1) –16.0 (11.4) –28.2** (13.1) 
Age of selection –2.3 (2.6) –1.8 (2.3) –6.1** (2.6) 
Interactions with educational systems    
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified –16.5** (2.5) –14.0** (2.3) –14.3** (2.5) 
Parental ESCS* moderately stratified –16.5** (3.3) –17.3** (3.1) –15.9** (3.3) 
Average ESCS* strongly stratified 19.5** (6.2) 18.4** (5.7) 10.1 (6.1) 
Average ESCS* moderately stratified –11.0 (8.3) –5.8 (7.7) –17.7** (8.3) 
Higher secondary* strongly stratified 16.3** (6.5) 11.4* (6.0) 13.0** (6.4) 
Higher secondary* moderately stratified 32.7** (9.8) 27.8** (9.0) 20.3** (9.7) 
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Appendix E: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school 
characteristics, educational system characteristics (Model 6) on reading, math and science 
scores of migrant students. (cont.) !
Reproduction     
Parental ESCS* average ESCS –0.5 (1.8) 3.5** (1.6) 3.1** (1.8) 
Variation    
Individual-level 4,516.2 (89.0) 3,904.3 (76.9) 4,663.7 (91.0) 
Tracks-within-school level 917.1 (82.8) 792.0 (71.6) 793.2 (80.2) 
School level  - - - 
Origin-country level 000.0 (00.0) 000.0 (00.0) 291.4 (1640.2) 
Destination-country level 444.6 (91.7) 312.0 (67.0) 159.0 (1639.6) 
Log likelihood 97,314 96,060 97,415 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix F: The effects of individual characteristics and educational system characteristics 
(Model 6) on reading scores of migrant students with the measured and country-centred track 
level. 
 
 Measured track level Centred track level 
Constant 457.7 (44.2) 457.2 (45.6) 
Individual characteristics   
Parental ESCS 25.0** (2.1) 24.9** (2.1) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –8.2 (6.8) –6.9 (7.0) 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref=Western OECD countries) 18.6* (10.2) 19.6* (10.5) 
Islamic countries origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –35.3** (8.4) –35.2** (8.6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref=Western OECD countries) –15.0 (14.2) –14.6 (14.7) 
Female 28.6** (1.6) 28.6** (1.6)  
Home language same as in destination country 24.2** (2.2) 24.2** (2.2) 
One parent migrant, other parent native 5.8 (3.8) 5.7 (3.8) 
Second-generation migrant 9.3** (1.8) 9.4** (1.8) 
Grade (destination-country centred) 31.8** (1.8) 33.0** (1.8) 
School-composition characteristics at tracks-within-school   
Average ESCS 46.9** (5.1) 46.9** (5.1) 
% students from Eastern Europe (ref=% native students) 0.4** (0.2) 0.4** (0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia (ref=% native students) 1.2** (0.2) 1.2** (0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries (ref=% native students) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 
% students from Western OECD countries (ref=% native students) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
% students from Sub-Saharan Africa (ref=% native students) –0.2 (0.4) –0.2 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity  20.0 (14.0) 18.8 (14.0) 
Ethnic diversity  –40.3** (11.2) –40.9** (11.2) 
Curriculum at tracks-within-school   
Vocational (ref=general) –54.1** (4.6) –48.7** (4.5) 
Higher secondary (ref=lower) –0.8 (4.9) –1.0 (2.6) 
Selective admittance (ref=some selective admittance) 18.0** (2.8) 18.5** (2.8) 
Non-selective admittance (ref=some selective admittance) 1.0 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) 
School characteristics   
Teacher shortage –1.6 (1.1) –1.6 (1.1) 
Student/staff ratio 0.8** (0.3) 0.7** (0.3) 
School in city (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 2.6 (2.7) 
School in rural (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 2.6 (2.7) 
School size*100 0.7** (0.2) 0.7** (0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=public school) –4.9 (3.7) –5.3 (3.7) 
Private independent (ref=public school) –6.4 (5.4) –6.9 (5.4) 
Educational system characteristics   
Strongly stratified (ref=comprehensive) –16.7 (14.5) –10.9 (15.0) 
Moderately stratified (ref=comprehensive) –16.7 (13.1) –1.1 (12.7) 
Age of selection –2.3 (2.6) –2.3 (2.7) 
Interactions with educational systems   
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified –16.5** (2.5) –16.4 **(2.5) 
Parental ESCS* moderately stratified –16.5** (3.3) –16.4** (3.3) 
Average ESCS* strongly stratified 19.5** (6.2) 21.3** (6.2) 
Average ESCS* moderately stratified –11.0 (8.3) –8.8 (8.6) 
Higher secondary* strongly stratified 16.3** (6.5) 4.3 (3.3) 
Higher secondary* moderately stratified 32.7** (9.8) 16.7* (5.1) 
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Appendix F: The effects of individual characteristics and educational system characteristics 
(Model 6) on reading scores of migrant students with the measured and country-centred track 
level. (cont.) !
Reproduction    
Parental ESCS* average ESCS –0.5 (1.8) –0.4 (1.8) 
Variation   
Individual-level 4,516.2 (89.0) 4,511.0 (88.9) 
Tracks-within-school level 917.1 (82.8) 926.0 (83.1) 
School level  - - 
Origin-country level 000.0 (00.0) 000.0 (00.0) 
Destination-country level 444.6 (91.7) 484.6 (98.8) 
Log likelihood 97,314 97,321 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix G: Estimation of educational performance of first-generation migrant students from Western OECD countries with different parental 
ESCS, in schools with different ESCS composition and track level and in different educational systems (Model 6 of Table 1). The scores of the 
migrant students from Eastern Europe, non-Islamic Asia, Islamic countries, and Sub-Saharan African countries can be obtained by changing the 
scores with –8.2, +18.6, –35.3 and –15.0, respectively. The scores of second-generation migrant students should be changed with +9.3, of those 
who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2, and those with mixed parents with +5.8. 
 
Comprehensive & lowest school ECSC (-2.07) 
 parameter 
Lowest parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0.8 -0.8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
Strongly stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Moderately stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 -4.6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 
  198,5 384,6 246 438,7 254 446,7 
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Appendix G: (cont.) 
 
Comprehensive & highest school ESCS (1.64) 
 Parameter 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 
School ESCS 46.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 
Vocational –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher secondary –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8 –0.8 
Parent ESCS 25.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 
Strongly stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Moderately stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*strongly 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*moderately 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*strongly 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*moderately –11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS –0.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 
  374.1 553.0 428.2 607.1 427.4 606.3 
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Appendix G: (cont.) 
 
Moderately stratified & lowest school ESCS (–2.07) 
 Parameter 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 
School ESCS 46.9 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 
Vocational –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher secondary –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 6.2 
Parent ESCS 25.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 
Strongly stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Moderately stratified –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 
Higher*strongly 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*moderately 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.7 32.7 
School ESCS*strongly 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*moderately –11.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  –16.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS –0.5 –4.6 3.1 –4.6 3.1 –4.6 3.1 
  259.4 323.4 306.9 377.5 345.8 416.4 
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Appendix G: (cont.) 
 
Moderately stratified & highest school ESCS (1.64) 
 Parameter 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 
School ESCS 46.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 
Vocational –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher secondary –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8 –0.8 
Parent ESCS 25.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 
Strongly stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Moderately stratified –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 
Higher*strongly 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*moderately 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.7 32.7 
School ESCS*strongly 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*moderately –11.0 –18.0 –18.0 –18.0 –18.0 –18.0 –18.0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  –16.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS –0.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 
  412.0 468.8 466.1 522.9 498.0 554.8 
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Appendix G: (cont.) 
 
Strongly stratified & lowest school ESCS (–2.07) 
 Parameter 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 
School ESCS 46.9 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 –97.1 
Vocational –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher secondary –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8 –0.8 
Parent ESCS 25.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 
Strongly stratified –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 
Moderately stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*strongly 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 16.3 
Higher*moderately 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*strongly 19.5 –40.4 –40.4 –40.4 –40.4 –40.4 –40.4 
School ESCS*moderately –11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  –16.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 
Parent ESCS*moderately  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS –0.5 –4.6 3.1 –4.6 3.1 –4.6 3.1 
  214.0 278.0 261.5 332.1 277.0 347.6 
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Appendix G: (cont.) 
 
Strongly & Highest school ESCS (1.64) 
 Parameter 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
Lowest parent 
ESCS (–4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
Highest parent 
ESCS (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 457.7 
School ESCS 46.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 
Vocational –54.1 –54.1 –54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher secondary –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8 –0.8 
Parent ESCS 25.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 –110.0 75.0 
Strongly stratified –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 –16.7 
Moderately stratified –16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Higher*strongly 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 16.3 
Higher*moderately 32.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
School ESCS*strongly 19.5 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 
School ESCS*moderately –11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  –16.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 72.6 –49.5 
Parent ESCS*moderately  –16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS –0.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 3.6 –2.5 
  462.0 518.8 516.1 572.9 531.6 588.4 
 
 
